Gary Macshara, a Minor by His Guardian, Burt S. Macshara, Jr. v. Rulon Roy Garfield : Respondent\u27s Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1967
Gary Macshara, a Minor by His Guardian, Burt S.
Macshara, Jr. v. Rulon Roy Garfield : Respondent's
Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
David K. Watkiss and George B. Handy; Attorneys for Respondent
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Macshara v. Garfield, No. 10579 (Utah Supreme Court, 1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/23
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GARY MACSHARA, a minor, by 
his Guardian, BURT S. MAC-
SHARA, JR., Appellant, 
vs. 
RULON ROY GARFIELD, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 
10579 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal From the Judgment of the Second District Oomt 
For Weber County, State of Utah 
Honorable Parley E. Norseth, Judge 
UNJVERSJTY OF. UTAISi 
JANI 3 1967 
DAVID K. WATKISS, Esq, 
GEORGE B. HANDY, Esq •. --·'. \.:SttAlllYJ 
600 El Paso Natural Gas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
CLYDE C. PATTERSON, Esq. 
427 - 27th Street 
F ~LED Ogden, Utah Attorney for Appellant 
tJ_!G ?, j 1966 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEJ\lENT OF NATURE OF CASE ________ I 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT____ I 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL __________________ 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS---------------------------------- 2 
ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------ 13 
POINT L THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN RE-
FUSING TO ALLO'V APPELLANT'S EX-
PERT 'VITNESS TO ATTEMPT TO RE-
CONSTRUCT THE COLLISION AND 
STATE VVHAT THE VEHICLES DID 
AFTER IMP ACT AND THE SPEED OF 
APPELLANT'S VEHICLE AT TIME OF 
COLLISION SINCE (A) THE DETERMI-
NATION TO ADMIT SUCH EVIDENCE 
RESTS 'VITHIN THE SOUND DISCRE-
TION OF THE TRIAL COURT; (B) THERE 
'VAS INSUFFICIENT FOUNDATION 
LAID FOR THE ADMISSION OF THE 
TESTIMONY; (C) THE TEST IM 0 NY 
''rAs PREDICATED UPON EVIDENCE 
\VHICH THE JURY 'VAS EQUALLY CAP-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
ABLE OF EVALUATING; (D) THE RE-
FUSAL TO ADMIT SUCH EVIDENCE 
';y AS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR. ______________ 13 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT DID 
NOT COMMIT ERROR IN REFUSING TO 
GIVE AN INSTRUCTION ON THE EF-
FECT OF APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF AM-
NESIA, AND THE RECORD DOES NOT 
PRESENT THIS ISSUE FOR REVIE'l\T BY 
THIS COURT. _________________ .. ----------------------------------- 27 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT DID 
NOT COMMIT ERROR IN REFUSING TO 
GIVE INSTRUCTIONS BASED ON J.I.F.U. 
UTAH 21.10, 21.12, 21.14, 21.16, 16.10 AND 
THE RECORD BEFORE THE COURT IS 
NOT IN SUCH A POSTURE AS WOULD 
ALLO'V THE REVIE'l\T OF THE APPEL-
LANT'S CLAIM OF ERROR, NOR DID 
THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GIVING IN-
STRUCTIONS 8, 9, 19 AND IL ______________________ . 33 
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID 
NOT COMMIT ERROR IN ALLOWING 
THE RESPONDENT TO PRESENT EVI-
DENCE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE 
APPELLANT ';y AS OPERATING HIS 
VEHICLE AT A HIGH RATE OF SPEED 
IN A DANGEROUS MANNER AT A 
SHORT DISTANCE A'l\TAY FROM THE 
SITE OF THE COLLISION, SINCE (A) NO 
OBJECTION WAS TIMELY MADE TO 
THE EVIDENCE; (B) THE EVIDENCE 
WAS RELEVANT AND OTHER,l\TISE AD-
:MISSABLE. -------------------------------------------------------------- 38 
11 
-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
POINT V. THE TRIAL COURT DID 
NO'f COMMIT ERROR IN ADMITTING 
THE T E S T I M 0 N Y OF A 'iVITNESS 
WHOSE NAME 'iVAS NOT PROVIDED TO 
PLAINTIFF PRIOR TO TRIAL. ____________________ 45 
CONCLUSION ----------------------------------·--------------------- 46 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
46 A.L.R. 2d 35 ---------------------------------------------------------- 41 
46 A.L.R. 2d page 9 -----·------·------·------------------------------ 44 
93 A.L.R. 2d 287 -------···-·-·-----···-··-··---------------··-···-······ 25 
133 A.L.R. 726 ·-··············-········-··-------·-------·-------·-······· 25 
8 Am. J ur. 2d P 992 --··-·-----·-·············---------------··········· 22 
9C Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Autotmobile Law 
and Practice § 6235 ····---··-······-·--------------------------43 
CASES CITED 
Allen v. Porter, 19 'Vash. 2d 503, 143 P.2d 328 
( 1943) ------------------------------------------------------------------·- 23 
Alvarado Y. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 368 P.2d 986 
( 1954) -----······----······-··-------··-····------------------------------14 
Bailey v. Rhodes, 202, Ore. 511, 276 P.2d 713 ---- 25 
Brooks v. Utah Hotel Co., 108 Utah 220, 159 P.2d 
127 ( 1945) ----------------------------------------------------·--·---- 38 
Child Y. Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P.2d 981 
( 1958) ------·-···--------------···-···--··-·------------------------------40 
Clark v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co., 73 Utah 
48" ~.-, ;.-. p "82 ----------------·-------------------------- 33 v, - oJ • ..., ---------
111 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
Comins v. Scrivener, 214 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 
1954) ' ' ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 41 
Compton v. Ogden Union Ry. and Depot Co., 
20 Utah 453, 23.5 P.2d 515 ------------------------------ 33 
Cox v. Thompson, 123 Utah 81, 254 P.2d 1047 
( 1953) ------------------------------------ ----------------------- 32, 33 
Day v. Lorenzo Smith & Co., Inc., 17 Utah 2d, 221, 
408, P.2d 186 (1965) ---------------------------------- 18, 22 
Evans Y. Butters, 16 Utah 2d 272, 399 P.2d 210 
( 1965) ------------------------------------------------------------------·· 31 
Evans v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 37 Utah 431, 
108 P. 638 ------------------------------------------------------------ 33 
Fretz v. Anderson, 5 Utah 2d 290, 300 P.2d 642 
( 1956) -------------------------------------------------------------------· 42 
Gittins v. Lundberg, 3 Utah 2d 392, 284 P.2d 1115 
( 1955) -----------------------------------------------------------------·-· 15 
Hales v. Peterson, 11 Utah 2d 411, 360 P.2d 822 
( 1961) ---------------------·--------------------------------------------·· 37 
Haywood v. D. & R.G. ,V. & Co., 6 Utah 2d 155, 
307 P.2d 1045 ( 1957) -----------------------------------··· 3i 
Lemmor v. Denver & Rio Grande 'Vestern Railroad 
Co., 9 Utah 2d 195, 341 P.2d 215 (1960) ________ 31 
Lund v. Mtn. Fuel Supply Co., 12 Utah 2d 268, 
365 P.2d 633 ( 1961) ---------------------------------------··· 20 
Marshall v. Mullin, 212 Ore. 421, 320 P.2d 258 ____ 2i 
Martin v. Stevens, 121 Utah 48.J., 243 P.2d 747 ---·-··· 3j 
McMurdie v. Underwood, 9 Utah 2d 400, 346 P.2d 
31i 711 ( 1959) ----------······----········-···-------------------····-···· 
lV 
-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
.Mingus v. Olsson, 114 Utah 505, 202 P.2d 495 ________ 33 
Nelson v. Arrowhead Freight Lines Ltd., 99 Utah 
129 104 P.2d 225 ··············································--36 
Ostertag v. LaMont, 9 Utah 2d 130 339 P.2d 1022 
( 1959) ···································································· 36 
Redd v. Airway Motor Coach Line, Inc., 104 Utah 
9, 137 P.2d 374 ( 1943) ...................................... 36 
Ryan v. Union Pac. R. Co., 46 Utah 530, 151 P. 7L 33 
Shaw v. Sylvester, 253 N.C. 176, 116 S.E. 2d 35L .. 23 
Shupe v. l\Ienlove, No. 10405 .................................... 38 
Sine v. Salt Lake Transportation Co., 106 Utah 289, 
147 P.2d 875 .......................................................... 35 
Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P.2d 834 
( 1951) ···································································· 20 
State v. Freeman, 93 Utah 125 71, P.2d 196, 
( 1937) .................................................................... 42 
Taylor v .. Johnson, 414 P.2d 575 (Utah 1966) .... 18 
Thomas v. Dad's Root Beer & Canada Dry Bottling 
Co. of Portland, 225 Ore. 166, 356 P.2d 418 
( 1960) ···································· ······················· 24 
Tidwell v. Davidson, 54 'V ash. 2d 75, 338 P.2d 326 
( 1959) ···································································· 24 
Tuttle v. P.I.E. Co., 121 Utah 420, 242 P.2d 764 
( 1952) ···························································· 32, 33 "r arren v. Hynes, 4 "\Vash. 2d 128, 102 P.2d 69L .. 23 
Watkins v. Simonds, 14 Utah 2d 406, 385 P.2d 154 
( 1963) ···································································· 28 
Webb v. Olin Matheson Chemical Corp., 9 Utah 2d 
275, 3t2 P.2d 109-1 (1959) ............................ 19, 20 
v 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Nelson, 
11 Utah 2d 253, 3.58 P.2d 81 (1960) ............ 20 
'Vilson v. Gardner, 10 Utah 2d 89, 348 P.2d 931 
( 1960) ............................. ____________ .......................... 37 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 § 4106072 (a) ................ 34 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61 ................ 27 
Vi 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GARY l\IACSHARA, a minor, by 
his Guardian, BURT S. lVIAC-
SHARA, JR., Ap pclla11t, 
vs. 
RULON ROY GARFIELD, 
Respundcni. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10579 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Gary Macshara, appeals from a 
jury Yerdict in the District Court of 'Veber County 
finding no cause of action on the appellant's suit against 
respondent for alleged injuries sustained as the result 
of an intersection automobile collision at the intersection 
of Tyler A venue and Sheridan Drive in Ogden, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT 
The appellant filed a complaint in the District 
Court of 'Veber County, State of Utah, contending 
1 
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that the respondent was negligent and that the respond-
ent's negligence caused injuries to the appellant as 
the result of an intersection automobile collision between 
a vehicle operated by the appellant and a vehicle op-
erated by the respondent on Sunday, August 23rd, 
1964. An answer denying the allegations in the appel· 
lant's complaint was duly filed. A pretrial order was 
entered, and at the time of pretrial it was stipulated 
that there were no signals, signs or semaphores direct-
ing traffic at the intersection. Trial was had in the 
District Court of Weber County, the Honorable Parley 
E. Norseth, Judge, sitting with jury. The case was 
submitted to the jury, who returned a verdict in favor 
of the respondent. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the decision of the Dis-
trict Court and the jury's verdict of no cause of action 
should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent submits the following Statement of 
Facts in accordance with the general principle that, in 
viewing the case on appeal, the facts will be reviewed 
in a light most favorable to the trial court's verdict. 
Tyler Avenue runs north and south and Sheridan 
Drive east and west in Ogden City, Utah. Both streets 
are of the same width ( T-8) . l~oth streets are hard· 
surfaced and the intersection is generally a "four square 
2 
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intersection", each street having one lane of traffic 
in each direction ( T-11) . The speed limit in the area 
was 25 miles per hour ( T-311). There were no traffic 
lights or other signs to control traffic at the intersec-
tion ('f-12, 13). 
On August 23, 1964 at about 7:15 P.M., the 
respondent, Rulon Garfield, was leisurely driving home 
from church, traveling West on Sheridan Avenue at 
a speed of from 20 to 25 miles per hour. Mr. Garfield 
was driving a 1960 Mercury, two-door automobile. In 
the car with him were his wife and seven children ( T-
14). He slowed as he approached the intersection of 
Tyler Avenue (T-14, 385). Mr. Garfield testified that 
he first saw the appellant's vehicle when he was approxi-
mately twenty feet away from the intersection. At that 
time, he indicated that the plaintiff's vehicle was well to 
the North of the intersection, approximately 85 to 
87 feet up the street (T-319, 320). Mr. Garfield esti-
mated the speed of appellant's approaching vehicle 
to be approximately 50 miles per hour (T-323). 
Upon seeing the rapidly a pp roaching vehicle, 
respondent Garfield immediately slammed on his brakes 
and either was stopped or just about stopped as the 
appellant's vehicle scraped across the front end of his 
automobile ( T-16, 318). Respondent testified that he 
observed the appellant driving the approaching vehicle 
as it neared the intersection and that he noticed the 
appellant look away from him, West toward the other 
side of his vehicle ( T-317). 
3 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr .Garfield indicated that the appellant's vehicle 
seemed to be traveling at a very high rate of speed 
and that he observed no decrease in the speed of the 
vehicle until the collision ( T-318). The impact of the 
collision pulled the Garfield vehicle to the Southwest 
and it stopped near the center of the intersection. The 
appellant's vehicle lined off towards the Southwest 
and, according to Mr. Garfield, hit the curb and then 
"sort of flipped over" with the gas tank coming off 
the car ( T-318). The vehicle then skidded to a stop on 
the lawn of the house located on the southwest corner 
of the intersection ( T-38, 39) . 
Mrs. Garfield, the wife of the respondent, who was 
seated in the front seat of the passenger side, testified 
that the Garfield car had been traveling about 20 miles 
per hour West on Sheridan Drive as it approached 
the intersection of Tyler Avenue (T-402, 403). When 
she was about 45 feet from the intersection she saw 
appellant's approaching car, which appeared to be 
then approximately 140 feet North of the intersection. 
She estimated the speed of the appellant's vehicle to 
be .50 miles per hour ( T-405). Mrs. Garfield testified 
her husband slammed on the brakes and that she thought 
their car had come to a stop just prior to the impact 
with the MacShara vehicle (T-409). She stated that 
the appellant's car scraped across the front of their 
car going quite fast, twisting their car somewhat to 
the Southwest near the center of the intersection (T· 
408). The impact did not cause her to be thrown for· 
4 
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ward, but moved their car some three or four feet to 
the South and 'Vest ( T-406, 407) . 
Tom 'Vhittemore, an eighteen year old friend of 
the appellant was a passenger in the appellant's vehicle 
(T-164, 165). He was seated in the front seat turned, 
looking toward appellant, and conversing with him 
as they a pp roached the intersection ( T-167, 169). He 
testified ( T-168, 169) : 
"A 'Vell, we left the Church and we started 
down Tyler. That is south on Tyler. And we 
continued down that road until we got almost to 
the intersection, and Gary looked up the road 
and then he looked straight ahead for a few - -
"THE COURT: 'Vait. You say Gary looked 
up the road? 
"THE 'VITNESS: Yes. 
"THE COURT: All right. 
"A Up east. Up Sheridan. 
"MR. 'VATKISS: Now- Well, go ahead. 
"THE COURT: Go ahead. 
"A And then he looked straight, then looked 
down at me, and I guess I must have looked 
pretty shocked, because I saw the car first. And 
then he spun around just as I saw the car hit, 
and I don't remember anything from then until 
I saw Gary fall out of the car onto the lawn. 
And I realized the car had stopped, and I 
jumped out and saw, well, the condition Gary 
. " was m. 
He said that he had observed the Garfield vehicle when 
the MacShara car was entering the intersection and 
5 
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estimated it to have been approximately 40 feet East 
of them when he first saw it. He could not say whether 
the Garfield vehicle was then also in the intersection 
(T-170). 
On cross-examination Mr. 'Vhittemore admitted 
that he saw the Garfiel<l car before the appellant saw 
it and that the collision occurred almost "simultane-
ously" with the instant that he saw the respondent's 
vehicle (T-211, 214, 215). Further, his testimony on 
cross-examination was exactly contrary to his testimony 
on direct examination when he was asked more speci· 
fically with reference to where the appellant was l?ok· 
ing at the time the accident occurred (T-212-214). 
This testimony was also in conflict with a prior written 
statement given by Mr. 'Vhittemore (Defendant's Ex. 
1) wherein he stated: 
"'Ve were traveling south on Tyler and talk· 
ing. All of a sudden I looked up and saw a west 
bound car almost on point of impact with us. 
I think I said "Look Gary" and he looked up 
and saw the westbound car just as it hit us. 
This was the first Gary !~ad seen the westbound 
car. I think Gary maybe said, "Oh no" and tried 
to step on the gas and then we were hit." 
The appellant, Gary .MacShara, testified that he 
and his companion had stopped in the vicinity of the 
Presbyterian Church immediately prior to approaching 
the intersection (T-221). Mr. 'Vhittemore's testimony 
indicated that they had not actually stopped in the 
Church, but had merely driven through the parking 
area ( T-208) (Defendant's Exhibit 1). 
6 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'Vith reference to what occurred at the time of 
the accident, the appellant testified ( T-222) : 
"Q So then what happened? 
"A 'Vell, I don't know. I remember little 
places, and I remember we started out from the 
driveway of the Church. And that goes right 
down onto Tyler. And when we left the Church, 
we started out there, and then we had gone a 
little ways. I can't remember what was taking 
place in the car, except that we had an idea we 
were going down to Rick's to play pingpong, 
and so we just went south, and I just shifted out 
of second, and I don't-I glanced over at Tom, 
and I don't remember why or how long I glanced 
at him or anything, except he was staring at 
something on my left, and I couldn't tell you 
what it was he was looking at. 'Vhether it was 
the car, or whether it was just the way he was 
sitting in the car. But I turned my head to the 
side, and I saw the grill of the car." 
He further stated (T-223): 
"Q 'Vhat do you remember next? 
"A Well, I remember I heard a crash on 
the door - - it didn't sound like much - - and I 
remember it felt like I just got thrown out from 
under the steering wheel, and I bumped my head 
on the side of the car, and then everything was 
kind of blurry until I found myself laying on 
the lawn." 
On cross-examination, the appellant stated that he 
remembered stopping at the Church parking lot, driv-
7 
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ing out of the lot, driving South on Tyler Avenue, 
discussing with Tom 'Vhittemore what street to turn 
off on Tyler, shifting gears, and admitted looking over 
at his companion and seeing a peculiar or startled, sur-
prised look on Mr. 'Vhittemore's face (T-235, 236, 
237). He also stated that the first time he remembered 
seeing the car of the respondent was when he was just 
about to collide with it (T-237). He stated that regard-
ing the impact, he remembered the hit and the screech-
ing of the tires ( T-237) . 
Mr. and l\1rs. Horace J. Vause, on the evening in 
question, were sitting on their front porch at 1222 1st 
Street, which is just to the West of Tyler Avenue and 
three quarters of a block North of Sheridan Drive 
(T-344). Mr. Vause was called by the respondent and 
testified that he observed the appellant's vehicle travel-
ing in the vicinity of his home a "matter of seconds'' 
before the accident (T-352, 335), and that he saw the 
car come around the corner on two wheels, heard the 
screech of tires of appellant's vehicle and estimated 
his speed to be approximately 45 miles per hour while 
it was going around a circular block across from the 
witness's house (T-352). Approximately 25 seconds 
later Mr. Vause heard a loud crash in the vicinity of 
the intersection of Tyler and Sheridan and then went 
to the accident scene, where he again saw the MacShara 
vehicle that he had observed being driven a few seconds 
before by his house by the appellant (T-345, 355). 
No objection was raised by the appellant's counsel to 
the testimony of Mr. Vause until sometime after the 
8 
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testimony was admitted and then he made a Motion 
to Strike.1 
l\Irs. Lorraine Va use, who was sitting 1\·ith her 
husband on the front porch, was called by the respond-
ent and testified without objection that she also saw 
the MacShara vehicle circling the block across from 
her home and that she estimated the speed of said 
yehicle to be "well over 35 miles per hour" ( T-380). 
She also heard the crash within a minute after seeing 
the MacShara car speed by her home and then went 
to the scene and saw the vehicles involved (T-379, 
380). 
Mr. Gordon F. McFarland had just come out of 
his house nt 127 North Iowa Street, which is located 
a few doors from the Vause home, when he saw the 
l\IacShara vehicle going around a corner across from 
his home at a high rate of speed, which he estimated to 
be between 40 and 45 miles per hour ( T-395) . Just 
after seeing the car speed around the corner, Mr. Mc-
Farland heard the crash and went to the accident scene 
where he again saw the Mac Shara vehicle ( T-394) . 
The testimony of Mr. McFarland was objected to by 
the appellant's counsel on the ground that he was not 
one of the proposed witnesses that respondent's counsel 
had supplied him the names of prior to trial. Respond-
ent's counsel indicated that he had just discovered the 
witness the night before he was called to testify and 
that he had so advised appellant's counsel the following 
1 The witnc>sses' testimony begins Transcript 349; the Motion 
to Strike was not made until Transcript 373. 
9 
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mornmg ( T-392) . The court, of course, allowed the 
testimony. 
Officer David G. Reed of the Ogden City Police 
Department, the investigating officer, indicated that 
at the time of the accident the measurements he took 
were merely paces and that he did not take taped or 
calculated measurements until a day or two later (T-
53) . There were no skid marks from the appellant's 
vehicle (T-143), however, there were approximately 12 
feet of skid marks from the right side and 15 feet of skid 
marks from the left side of the respondent's vehicle (T-
53). Officer Reed placed the point of impact approxi-
mately 18 feet East of the ''Test curb line of Tyler 
Avenue and 18 feet South of the North curb line of 
Sheridan Drive ( T-50). Officer Reed stated that he 
noted gouges on the curb line and on the lawn imme-
diately in front of the home where the appellant's 
car came to rest, which he testified were caused by 
the appellant's vehicle (T-56). Gouge marks were also 
observed in the intersection, but the officer indicated 
that he couldn't identify the size or the depth of the 
gouge marks appearing in the intersection or on the 
grass where the vehicle came to rest. The officer stated 
that he took a statement from the appellant, who said 
he did not see the respondent's vehicle until the grill 
was at his door ( T-59, 160). 
Captain Alvin ,iV. Foulger of the Ogden City 
Police Department, testified that he came to the scene 
of the accident to see if he could assist the investigating 
10 
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officer, but that he did not take detailed measurements 
or concern himself with the condition of the intersection 
until the following day ( T-246, 299). He stated that 
the point of impact on the vehicles was the front end 
of the respondent's vehicle and the area at about the 
corner post between the front and rear door on the 
appellant's vehicle (T-252). He stated that some days 
subsequent to the accident, he noticed asphalt gouges 
and chips in the curbing and on the lawn v.rhere the 
MacShara vehicle had come to rest (T-260, 261). 
Appellant's counsel asked Capta~n Foulger to 
explain, based on the physical evidence, his opinion 
as to what had happened (T-267). The Court sus-
tained an objection to this question. The trial Court 
also sustained an objection to the witness testifying 
as to the speed of the vehicles based upon his observation 
of the damage done to the vehicles ( T-276). He was, 
however, allowed to give his opinion as to the speed 
of the respondent's vehicle on the basis of the skid marks 
laid down. He placed the speed of the Garfield vehicle 
at 25.30 miles per hour based upon the skid marks 
(T-283). The Court also sustained an objection to 
the officer's opinion on the speed of the vehicles with 
reference to what he could determine from certain 
photographs ( 'l'-309) . The appellant was allowed to 
make an offer of proof as to what he would intend 
to have shown by the physical evidence ( '1'-287, 288). 
Dr. Leo ,V. Benson, the treating physician at 
the time the appellant was brought to the emergency 
11 
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room, indicated that the appellant was confused and 
could not explain the circumstances surrounding the 
accident. Dr. Charles 1\1. Swindler, the orthopedic 
specialist who operated on the appellant, also tes· 
tified that appellant could not give a clear cut state· 
ment of the details concerning the injury ( T-78) . Dr. 
Richard S. Iverson, a psychiatrist, who examined appel· 
lant once a few weeks before the trial, testified that 
appellant seemed to be suffering from a form of retro· 
grade amnesia, which is the result of the loss of con· 
sciousnes which interferes with the memory process. 
He stated that he concluded this because appellant 
couldn't remember looking east up Sheridan Drive to 
see if any cars were coming ( T-194) . 
Dr. Swindler testified that the defendant had a 
pre-existing deformity of his spine known as "scolio· 
sis". When he was initially examined this deformity 
was not known and because of the curveature shown 
in the x-rays it appeared that appellant had suffered 
a severe injury to the spine, but without paralysis (T· 
69, 70) . An exploratory laminectomy was performed 
and an attempt was made to reduce the dislocation, 
which was initially believed the patient had sustained. 
When it was determined that the apparent dislocation 
was a deformity which could not be reduced, a spine 
fusion was carried out by means of bone grafts. 
Dr. Swindler acknowledged that his operation 
stabilized the pre-existing spine curveature so that the 
curveature would be less subject to arthritic degene· 
12 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ration, which is the complication or the end result of 
scoliosis ( T-82). Dr. Swindler indicated that there had 
not been very much dislocation or movement of the 
spinal column as a result of any trauma, but that he 
could not give an opinion as to the extent of the dis-
ability resulting from the pre-existing dislocation or 
curveature which existed prior to the accident ( T-95, 
87). 
Near the end of this long trial, which consumed 
ffre days, the jury was taken to the scene of the acci-
dent and permitted to observe the intersection involved 
and also the general area including the location of 
the Presbyteria11 Church, its parking lot where the 
appellant claims to have driven from to the scene of 
the accident and the location of the homes of the three 
witnesses, _Mr. and Mrs. Horace Vause and l\Ir. Mc-
Farland, who testified they observed appellant speeding 
around their block just prior to the collision (T-415). 
After hearing all of the evidence presented as out-
lined hereinabove and being fully instructed by the 
Court, the jury retired and subsequently returned a 
verdict for the respondent and against the appellant, 
no cause of action. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO 
ALLO-\V APPELLANT'S EXPERT 'VITNESS 
13 
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TO ATTEMPT TO RECONSTRUCT THE 
COLLISION AND STATE 'VHAT THE VE-
HICLES DID AFTER IMP ACT AND THE 
SPEED OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE AT 
TIME OF COLLISION SINCE (A) THE DE-
TERMINATION TO ADMIT SUCH EVI-
DENCE RESTS WITHIN THE SOUND DIS-
CRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT; (B) 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT FOUNDA-
TION LAID FOR THE ADMISSION OF THE , 
TESTIMONY; (C) THE TESTIMONY WAS 
PREDICATED UPON EVIDENCE WHICH 
THE JURY WAS EQUALLY CAPABLE OF 
EVALUATING; (D) THE REFUSAL TO AD-
MIT SUCH EVIDENCE 'VAS NOT PREJU- ' 
DICIAL ERROR. 
Appellant contends that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error in refusing to allow Captain Alvin 
W. Foulger of the Ogden City Police Department to 
testify as to his opinion regarding the speed of appel· 
lant's vehicle at the time of the collision, based upon 
certain physical evidence such as the damage to the 
respective vehicles, the position of the vehicles a~~ 
various scuff and gouge marks at the scene. 
It should be noted at the outset that this is not 
a refusal to allow the witness to testify as to the speed 
of appellant's vehicle based upon skid marks or other 
scientific tests. Consequently, such decisions as Alva· 
rado v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 368 P.2d 986 (1954) 
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and Gittins v. Lundberg, 3 Utah 2d 392, 284 P.2d 1115 
( 1955) are not relevant to this question, nor are several 
of the other cases cited in the appellant's brief which 
deal with the estimation and determination of speed 
from skid marks material to the consideration of this 
issue. 
The sole question is, whether from the physical 
facts surrounding the impact the estimation of the 
officer as to the speed of appellant's vehicle should 
have been allowed, and whether the failure to do 1>0 
was prejudicial error. It is submitted that under the 
facts of this case, the action of the trial court was proper. 
The appellant's expert witness was allowed to 
give his estimation of the speed of the respondent's 
vehicle based on the skid marks (T-277, 283). Captain 
Foulger was also allowed to give an opinion as to the 
point of impact on the MacShara vehicle and on the 
Garfielcl vehicle ( T-252, 255) and was allowed to 
interpret the damage he observed on the vehicles and 
testify that the scraping along the front of the Garfield 
vehicle was caused by the moYement of the nfacShara 
vehicle ( T-256, 307) . 
The only physical evidence at the scene relied on 
by the officer for his excluded testimony, were some 
gouge marks on the road, the damage to the vehicles, 
some gouge marks on the curbing and some markings 
on the lawn. The officer did not make any investigation 
of the physical evidence at the scene of the accident 
on the eYenin O' of the accident and made no measure-o 
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ments as to location or size of the gouge marks, scratches 
or holes found in the asphalt roadway, the curbing and 
the lawn ( T-294, 304). The officer made no attempt 
to locate the point of impact between the vehicles on 
the roadway (T-263). 
The appellant attempted, through hypothetical 
questions, to elicit the opinion of the officer as to what 
occurred to the respective vehicles following the im-
pact. The respondent's objection to such opinion testi-
mony was sustained. The appellant then attempted to 
establish the opinion of Captain Foulger as to the 
speed of each of the vehicles at the time of the collision, 
based upon the damage done to the vehicles and the 
course he assumed them to have taken following the 
impact ( T-27 5) . The damage to the vehicles was rep· 
resented by certain photographs that were introduced 
in evidence ( Exhs. K, L, N, 0 & P) . The court sus· 
tained the respondent's objection to such opinion. 
The qualifications of the expert to determine speed 
from physical damage were that he had attended certain 
schools for Ogden Police Officers where they were 
taught accident reconstruction and that for two years 
he had been with the hit-and-run detail, where he had 
to reconstruct hit-and-run accidents in order to deter· 
mine how the accident occurred and the probable part 
of the vehicle damage. This officer, however, did not 
testify that this enabled him to determine the speed 
of a vehicle at the time of the collision, nor did he 
testify that speed was an element in such work. Be 
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further stated that he had seen some films co;iducted 
by the National Safety Council indicating lhe extent 
of vehicle damage at various speeds ( T-27 5). 
The hypothetical question presented to the officer 
in order to determine the course of the vehicles follow-
ing the collision was based upon Officer Reed's ap-
praisal of the accident scene, which is indicated in 
plaintiff's Exhibit "F". Officer Reed admitted that 
he had not made any exact measurement on the night 
of the accident, but had merely paced off the area an<l 
did not make actual measurements until some days 
following the accident ( T-53). Additionally he indi-
cated that the gouge marks on the road, the chip marks 
on the curbing and the holes observed on the lawn were 
never measured as to respective location or as to their 
depth, or other characteristics. Captain Foulger ac-
knowledged that he had made no measurements as to 
the location or size of these gouge marks, scratches or 
holes ( T-304). No evidence was presented as to which 
vehicle had caused the gouge marks in the road as dis-
tinguished from the curb or those on the lawn. 
The customary testimony of investigating officers 
in accident cases such as this was admitted by the trial 
court. Officer Reed was allowed to give his opinion 
as to the point of impact on the highway. Captain 
Foulger was allowed to give his opinion as to the speed 
of the respondent's vehicle based on the skid marks 
,e observed on the roadway and his opinion as to where 
.e the impact occurred on the respectiYe vehicles. It is 
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submitted, therefore, that based on the state of the 
evidence and considering the fact that the jury heard 
all of this testimony regarding the physical evidence, 
was allowed to examine the photographs of the vehicle~ 
and actually visited the scene after hearing testimony, 
that the exclusion of Captain Foulger's opinion as to 
the speed of the appellant's vehicle was not error based 
as it was, primarily on the damage to the vehicles and 
his attempt to conjecture their actions following the 
impact. 
In the case of Day v. Lorenzo Smith & Son, Inc., 
17 Utah 2d, 221, 408 P.2d 186 (1965), this Court 
stated: 
"Although there is authority to the contrary, 
we believe the proper rule to be that a trial 
judge, in his discretion, may permit a qualified 
exQ._ert (in this case an experienced highway 
patrolman) to give his opinion as to the point 
of collision when a proper foundation for the 
opinion has been laid. This is subject to a caveat, 
however. The opinion should not be admitted if 
it's based on the same evidence as is available 
to the jury and a layman of ordinary intel
1
l,i· 
gence can equally determine what happened. 
In Taylor v. Johnson, 414 P.2d 575 (Utah 1966), 
this Court stated: 
"Whether the officer has sufficient back 
ground of learning and experience; also whether 
he takes into account the factors necessary to 
make an estimate of speed of sufficient accu· 
racy that the trin:l cou_rt b:liev~s it will be .of 
assistance to the Jury is pnmanly for the trial 
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court to determine. ''* * * The determination 
made by the trial court should be aiven some 
credit and should not be overturned unless it 
is made clearly to appear that he was in error 
in his judgment and that it resulted in substan-
tial prejudice." 
In 1'V ebb v. Olin li'Iathcson Chemical Corp., 9 
Utah 2d 2'7 .J, 342 P.2d 1094 ( 1959), this Court had 
occasion to comment on the acceptance of scientific 
evidence. In doing so, it stated on page IOG7: 
"Inherent in the position of the trial judge 
in the immediate control of the trial is the re-
sponsibility of passing upon whether the subject 
justifies expert testimony and the qualifications 
of the witness as to whether he can give sound 
and reliable help to the jury on it. 
"In view of the importance of the function 
entrusted to the expert witness, it is of great 
importance that the Court carefully scrutinize 
his qualifications to guard against being lead 
astray by the pseudo learned or charlatan who 
may purvey erroneous or too positive opinions 
without sound foundation. The practical exi-
gencies of the situation make it necessary that 
the trial court be allowed considerable latitude 
of discretion in making such determination. His 
rulings in that regard should not be disturbed 
lightly nor at all unless it clearly appears that 
he was in error in his judgment on the matter." 
Thus it appears evident that this Court is committed 
to the general rule that the trial court had broad latitude 
to determine whether to allow or reject expert testi-
mony and that the trial court's discretion will not be 
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overturned unless it is clearly demonstrated that it was 
abused. 
Based upon the facts of this case, including the 
fact that the physical evidence was equally available 
to the jury and that the proffer of testimony by the 
appellant was in part inconsistent with the actual evi-
dence given by the expert, to the extent the appellant 
indicated the testimony of the expert would show the 
respondent's vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed 
when his testimony based on the skid marks had been 
that respondent's speed was approximately 25 miles 
per hour, there was no abuse of discretion and, there-
fore, no basis for reversal. 
In addition, the respondent submits that there 
was an inadequate foundation laid to receive the evi-
dence. The necessity for the laying of an adequate foun-
dation to show the reliability of the testimony of an 
expert has been recognized in many instances by this 
Court. Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P.2d 
834 ( 1951) ; Webb v. Olin .Mathieson Chemical Corp., 
supra; Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Nel-
son, 11 Utah 2d 253, 358 P.2d 81 (1960). In the latter 
case, this Court stated: 
"The matter of proper foundation or quali-
fication of a witness to state an opinion where 
the same is permissible in evidence, lies largely 
in the sound discretion of the court." 
The Court also indicated that the discretion would not 
be found to have been abused unless it was manifest 
on appeal. 
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In the instant case, the foundation was so weak 
that the court could not be said to have abused its 
discretion in refusing to allow the testimony of appel-
lant's expert to be received on the speed of appellant's 
vehicle. First, the evidence was based in part upon 
the testimony of another officer who had not carefully 
measured the distances and other matters of physical 
evidence. Second, the gouge marks in the intersection 
were never identified as coming from any particular 
yehicle nor were the location or characteristics of these 
marks nor the other gouge marks in the curb and lawn 
specified in measurements or otherwise. Third, the 
expert witness' qualifications in the physical evidence 
field left something to be desired. 
Examination of motion picture films or recon-
struction for hit-and-run driving is hardly a qualifica-
tion to determine expertise of speed from physical 
impact. In addition, at no time did appellant's counsel 
determine from the witness the criteria to be used in 
determining the speed from a showing of physical 
damage. Unless this criteria were established, it could 
not be evaluated, and it would be difficult to determine 
whether there was any sound scientific premise for the 
opinion. Under these circumstances, it is submitted 
that the foundation necessary for the receipt of the 
testimony was inadequate and that the trial court 
properly exercised its discretion in refusing to accept 
the proffer of evidence. 
It is also submitted, that the nature of the evidence 
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was such that when all the facts that were before th( 
jury were considered, the expert's opinion was not 
properly admissible since tlie jury was equally capabli 
of making its own determination from the facts. First. 
there was eyewitness testimony as to the speed of tht 
rnrious vehicles. Secondly, the physical damage wa~ 
before the jury. Third, indications of whether the 
appellant's vehicle flipped before it struck the curb 
were matters for the jury's evaluation. 
In Day v. Lorenzo Smith & Son, Inc., supra, thi) 
Court indicated that not only must proper foundation 
be laid but that the caveat for the admissibility of expe11 
opm10n was that: 
''The opinion should not be admitted if it 
is based upon the same evidence as is available 
to the jury and a layman of ordinary intelli· 
gence can equally determine what happened." 
In that case, the trial court was held to have committed 
error in admitting evidence of a highway patrolman 
as to the point of impact where the evidence was at 
best, speculative. Other authorities have recognizer! 
limitations on the receipt of such testimony. In 8 Am. 
J ur., 2d, Automobiles and lli,<Jhway Traffic, § 992, it 
is stated: 
"In a case where the court evidently felt that 
the witness was not in the expert category, it 
was said that while the accident in question could 
describe to the jury the signs, marks, and con· 
ditions he found at the scene, including damage 
to the vehicle involved, he could not give an 
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op!mo~ as to the speed from these, the jury 
bemg Just as well qualified as the witness to 
determine what inferences the facts would per-
mit or require." ' 
The courts have seemed to recognize that this type of 
evidence often involves a mere guess and have excluded 
it. See Warren v. Hynes, 4 Wash. 2d 128, 102 P.2d 
691; Shaw v. Sylvester, 253 N.C. 176, 116 S.E. 2d 351. 
In Lund v. Mtn. Fuel Supply Co., 12 Utah 2d 
268, 365 P.2d 633 (1961), the jury had before it evi-
dence of facts concerning a broken gas line. This Court 
stated: 
"When facts may be ascertained by the ordi-
nary use of the senses of lay witnesses or jurors, 
it is not necessary that expert opinion be pro-
duced and relied on." 
Analagous to that case is the situation here where the 
facts were before the jury and they were capable of 
evaluating the evidence. In such case, expert evidence 
was not a matter that the Court was required to accept. 
In Allen v. Porter, 19 Wash. 2d 503, 143 P.2d 
328 (1943), the Washington Supreme Court affirmed 
the action of the trial court in refusing to allow an 
expert witness to testify from the physical damage to 
a motorcycle as to the speed of the motorcycle at the 
time of the accident. The Court stated: 
"':Vhile there is some conflict in decisions on 
this point, we believe the better rule is, that it 
is not a proper subject for expert testimony, 
since the court or jury can draw his or her own 
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conclusions from the facts, as well as the wit. 
~1ess, in the absence of a showing that the subject 
is beyond the understanding of the ordinan 
person." · 
In Tidwell v. Davidson, 54 'Yash. 2d 75, 338 P.2d 
326 ( 1959), the 'Vashingtou Court ruled that it would 
have been prejudicial error to allow an expert to testify 
from physical evidence as to the negligence of the parties 
or the speed of the vehicles. In that case, the court 
had before it a fact situation where exhibits showing 
pictures of the damage and surrounding circumstances 
were part of the basis of the offered conclusion of the 
expert. In the instant case, appellant also referred the 
expert to various exhibits that had been received into 
evidence which were pictures of the vehicles and al· 
tempted to predicate the proffer of testimony at least 
m part on these exhibits. 
In Thomas v. Dad's Root Beer & Canada Drv 
Bottling Co. of Portland, 225 Ore. 166, 356 P.2d 418 
( 1960), the Supreme Court of Oregon had before it 
facts comparable to those in the instant case. In holding 
that the failure of the trial court to receive the evidence 
of the expert witness concerning the point of impact 
of the vehicle was not error, the Court said: 
"We believe that the jury is as well able to 
draw its own inferences and reach its own con· 
clusions from the facts presented as is a witness 
who was not present at the time of the ac~ident. 
This type of evidence is analogous to estimates 
of spe~<l b~, one not an eyewitness. Competent 
and qualified eyewitnesses who have observed 
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a vehicle in motion are qualified to testify as to 
its rate of speed at the time of the accident. 
Bailey v. Rhodes, 202 Ore. 511, 276 P.2d 713. 
If the witness onlv heard the sound of the ve-
hicle, he may testify whether its movement was 
rapid or slow, but not as to the rate of speed 
in miles per hour, Marshall v. Mullin, 212 Ore. 
421, 320 P.2d 258. One not an eyewitness to an 
accident cannot give his opinion on the rate of 
speed based upon physical facts at the scene of 
accident, because the jury is as well able to draw 
its own inference and form its own opinion from 
the facts presented as is the witness." 
In an Annotation, 133 A.L.R. 726, it is stated: 
"Although there is some conflict among the 
few cases which have considered the question, the 
majority of them have refused to allow wit-
nesses to give expert evidence, based on the 
appearance or condition of an automobile after 
an accident, as to the speed of the car at the time 
the accident occurred, upon the grounds that 
the witnesses were not qualified experts or, that 
their conclusions if given would amount to a 
mere guess." 
In a more recent Annotation in 93 A.L.R. 2d 287, 
the principle now before the Court is discussed. It is 
noted that there is some difficulty in determining the 
actual decisions of the Courts as to whether they are 
rejecting the evidence as a matter of substantive rule 
or on the particular facts of the case. However, it is 
stated: 
"In any event, it maY: be sa~d. that i~ a large 
number of cases in which op1mon evidence as 
to speed was offered, based at least in part on 
25 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a witness's observation of the condition of ti 
motor vehicles after the accident, that testimo11 
was held inadmissible." 
It is submitted, therefore, that the matter of ao 
missibility of this opinion evidence rests in the sou 11, 
discretion of the trial court in the instant case a11, 
where there appears to be an insufficient foundation 
and where the evidence was such that the jury couk 
otherwise determine the facts of the case, the tria 
court acted properly ·within the limits of its discretior, 
m excluding the evidence. 
Finally, it is submitted that the failure to admi: 
the evidence could not have prejudiced the appellant" 
position. There was ample evidenee from the appellant\ 
companion, who was riding in appellant's vehicle, a' 
to appellant's inattention. Appellant's own testimon! 
indicated that he was inattentive and that this was~ 
definite eause of the accident. Several eyewitnesse, 
testified as to the speed of the appellant's vehicle ai 
the time of the collision or just immediately before th1 
collision, thus offering evidence which the jury wmtll, 
undoubtedly have considered to have demonstraten 
at least contributor;.' negligence on the part of tbf 
appellant. Further, the expert evidence from appel· 
}ant's own witness indicated that the speed of respono 
ent's vehicle was approximately 25 miles per hour 
which >vas the speed limi~ in the area. Any evidenc1 
on another basis than skid marks would have been in· 
consistent with the evidence offered from the skid marks 
Under thesie circumstances, whatever the testimoDi 
26 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
would have been, it could not be said that prejudice 
resulted from the refusal of the trial court to allow 
appellant to introduce this expert testimony. 
It is apparent that under the mandate of Rule 61 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding harm-
less error, that the appellant's claim for reversal is not 
well taken. It should be further noted that the appel-
lant was not precluded from attacking the eyewitness 
testimony of Mr. and l\irs. Vause and Mr. McFarland 
r 
regarding the speed of the MacShara car a block or 
so from the intersection, for the Court, over respond-
ent's objection, permitted Captain Foulger to testify 
with respect to certain speed tests that he had made 
with a similar car in the area just prior to the trial 
at the request of appellant's counsel (T-431, 444). 
According to the officer, the tests indicated that the 
maximum speed of a car could navigate the corners 
in question would be 32 miles per hour ( T-445) . This 
testimony indicates a further justification for the 
Court's ruling for it reveals that Captain Foulger 
was not just a disinterested traffic investigator, but 
had been employed by the appellant to testify as an 
expert in this case. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
ERROR IN REFUSING TO GIVE AN IN-
STRUCTION ON THE EFFECT OF APPEL-
LANT'S CLAIM OF AMNESIA, AND THE 
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RECORD DOES NOT PRESENT THIS ISSCL 
FOR REVIE'V BY THIS COURT. 
The appellant argues that the trial court shou]J 
haYe given an instruction to the jury on the effect oi 
his claimed retrograde amnesia. Admittedly, no sucli 
instruction was given. The appellant contends, in 
effect, the jury should have been instructed that under 
the facts of this case a presumption arises that the 
appellant was exercising due care for his safety. 
At the outset, it is submitted that the record is 
not so constituted as to allow the Court to consider this 
issue. It does not appear that the requested instructions 
of appellant have been designated as part of the record 
on appeal (T-17). Therefore, the record before thi.1 
court does not indicate that any such instruction was 
requested. The exceptions taken by appellant to the 
court's instructions are inadequate and imprecise in 
so far as informing as to wherein appellant felt the 
court erred (T-480, 482). Appellant's brief does not 
set forth the proposed instruction. 
In Watkins v. Simonds, 14 Utah 2d 406, 385 P.2d 
154 ( 1963), this Court stated: 
"Judgments of courts are presumed to be 
correct if nothing in the record appears to the 
contrarv and all doubts are resolYed in their 
favor. 'l'l1e record on appeal in this cause being 
devoid of anv and all evidence, it must be as· 
surned that t.he proceedings in the court below 
established a sufficient basis to support and 
justify the court's findings, conclusions and 
judgment." 
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Under the posture of the record in this case, where 
no request for an instruction on the claimed error 
appears of record nor an adequate exception, it must 
be presumed the trial court's actions were correct. Con-
sequently, the issue raised by appellant is not properly 
reviewable by this Court on appeal. 
Assuming for argument's sake that the contention 
of appellant is properly before the Court, it is sub-
mitted there is no merit to the contention that the trial 
court should have instructed on the issue of retrograde 
amnesia. The due care issue is simply not before the 
Court. Appellant contends there was no eyewitness 
to the accident. Respondent submits this is a distortion 
of the record and inaccurate. There were several eye-
witnesses. The def end ant Rulon Garfield testified that 
the appellant never saw him (T-24) and that appellant 
was traveling at a high rate of speed (T-33) which 
he estimated at 50 miles per hour ('l'-36, 311). This 
testimony was given on cross-examination. 
On direct examination, Mr. Garfield testified that 
the appellant looked away towards the opposite side 
of the appellant's car before the collision (T-317). He 
further in di ca ted there was no reduction of speed as 
respects the appellant's vehicle until the collision (T-
38). 
Mrs. Garfield, another eyewitness, also testified 
as to appellant's excessive speed and neglect for his 
own safety ( T-405). Also, other persons, although 
not eyewitnesses to the collision, testified appellant was 
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not driving in a cautious, reasonable manner shortli 
before the accident. 
Frank T. "Vhittemore, Jr., the appellant's be\ 
friend, a passenger in appellant's car, and a witnes 
for appellant, testified to appellant's negligent inal 
tention before the accident. . He testified appellan 
"spun around to the front" after looking at him jmt 
before the accident ( T-168). He stated that appellan 
didn't observe the Garfield car until just before th! 
impact, further indicating appellant was not keepini 
a proper lookout ( T-2ll, 2U, 215). Therefore, frorr 
appellant's own eyewitness there was evidence oi 
appellant's failure to use due care for his own safet~ 
at the time of the collision. 
The appellant seemed to be suffering from some· 
thing less than complete retrograde amnesia since he 
had a fairly clear memory of what occurred (T-222i. 
He recalled driving from the Church parking lot, shifl. 
ing gears and conversing with his passenger abou1 
where to turn off from Tyler as they approached the 
intersection. He admitted looking at the passenger i1i 
his car immediately prior to the collision and observing 
the startled look on his companion's face (T-236). He 
testified he first saw the respondent's car about the 
time of the collision, remembering a scraping of tire> 
after the collision, getting out and collapsing. From 
this state of the evidence, in spite of testimony from 
appellant's doctors that he was confused, and from 
Dr. Richard Iverson that his condition evidenced retro· 
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grade amnesia, it can be hardly said that appellant's 
own testimony would justify an instruction on the 
presumption of due care. Additionally, the appellant's 
condition, from his own testimony, does not support 
a conclusion of retrograde amnesia preventing recall 
of the accident, whatever his condition may have been 
on examination by his physician. 
"\Vith reference to the applicable law, the cases 
cited by appellant in support of his contention can be 
disposed of readily. Lenimor v. Denver & Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Co., 9 Utah 2d 195, 341 P.2d 215 
( 1960), does not even involve the principle urged by 
appellant. The issue of amnesia was not raised with 
reference to an instruction claimed applicable by appel-
lant in this case. In addition, the amnesia seemed 
relatively total. The case has no precedential value in 
the instant situation. 
Evans v. Butters, 16 Utah 2d 272, 399 P.2d 210 
(Hl65), is equally inapplicable to the facts of this case. 
First, the case did not involve a failure to instruct, 
but was a situation where the trial court took the case 
from the jury after plaintiff's evidence. Second, the 
court acknowledged that where the evidence shows a 
situation from the witness's own mouth that would 
preclude recovery the question of amnesia is not of 
significance. Such is the case here. Also the court's 
opinion refers to taking the case from the jury, a 
question not at issue here. Further, the Court noted 
that the presumption only lasts until evidence is pre-
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sented "to the contrary". In this case, there is onr· 
whelming evidence including testimony from appellant 
himself, indicating absence of clue care. Therefore, m, 
instruction on the presumption of due care was inappm 
priate. 
Other cases from this Court have concluded 011 
evidence similar to that now before the Court that tht 
presumption of due care is not applicable. In Tuttle 
v. P.l.E. Co., 121 Utah 420, 242 P.2d 764 ( 1952). 
this Court said on comparable facts: 
"Here the jury could reasonably find from 
the evidence that decedent was driving his car 
toward the south and turned his car suddenly 
and without warning into the course of the tra~· 
tor-trailer when it was too late to avoid an acci· 
dent and in so doing, he did not use reasonable 
care for his own safety. So the presumption was 
thereby destroyed and instructing the jury 
thereon could only confuse rather than eQ.lighten 
them, * * *." 
In Cox v. Thompson, 123 Utah 81, 254 P.2d 10~7 
( 1953), the appellant claimed the trial court had erred 
in directing a verdict for the defendant because it was 
to be presumed the deceased used due care. The court 
ruled the presumption was not applicable in the face 
of evidence of contributory negligence. The Court 
said: 
"If the presumption that a person in a place 
of danger exercises due care for his own safet.Y 
applies in this case, it will. be exting~ished if 
the evidence proper!~, sustams the findmg that 
decedent was contributorily negligent as a 
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matter of law. See 1'uttle v. Pacific lntermoun-
tain Express, 121 Utah 420, 242, P.2d 764; 
Compton v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 120 
Utah J.53, 235 P.2d 515; Mingus v. Olsson, 114 
Utah 505, 202 P.2d 495; Clark v. Los Angeles 
& Salt Lake R. Co., 73 Utah 486, 275 P. 582; 
Ryan v. Union Pac. R. Co., 46 Utah 530, 151 
P. 71; Evans v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 37 
Utah ·.131, 108 P. 638. * * *" 
The evidence in the instant case clearly demon-
strates appellant's absence of due care destroying the 
application of this presumption. The testimony from 
numerous witnesses as well as the circumstances of 
this collision, attested to the fact of the appellant's 
negligence. Thus the many cases noted in Cox v. 
Thompson, supra, and those recited in this brief refute 
the contention of appellant that an instruction urged 
in this appeal would have been appropriate. There is, 
therefore, no basis for reversal on the claim made in 
Point II of appellant's brief. A reading of the cases 
relied on by appellant reveal their lack of application 
to the instant case. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
ERROR IN REFUSING TO GIVE INSTRUC-
TIONS BASED ON J.LF.U. UTAH 21.10, 21.12, 
21.14, 21.16, 16.10 AND 16.12 AND THE REC-
ORD BEFORE THE COURT IS NOT IN SUCH 
A POSTURE AS \VOULD ALLO'V THE RE-
YIE'V OF THE APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF 
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ERROR, NOR DID THE TRIAL COURT ER] 
IN GIYING INSTRUCTIONS 8, 9, IO AND ll 
The appellant challenges the instructions given br 
the Court and its refusal to give some requested i1;. 
structions of the appellant. The instructions requestea 
by the appellant do not appear to be part of the recoru. 
Appellant makes various references to Jury Instrut· 
tion Forms of Utah, contending that these were !ht 
instructions he requested. However, since the actual 
instructions as they \Vere presented to the Court an 
not before this Court for review, it cannot be deter 
mined if the instructions were so drawn that they wen 
proper in the instant case. It is submitted that si1m 
the instructions requested by the appellant are not 
actually before the Court that the claims of error art 
not ripe for review. 
At the outset, the appellant contends that the 
trial court did not instruct on his theory of the case 
to the effect that when two vehicles enter an intersec· 
tion from two different highways at the same time thal 
the driver on the left must yield the right of way to 
the driver on the right, 41-6-72 (a) Utah Code Anno· 
tated 1953. The record, however, belies the allegation 
made by the appellant (T-469), since it appears that 
the Court's Instruction No. 10 gave not only the 
statutory language but also a more expansive form 
which properly appraised the jury of all the issues in 
the case. 
The appellant calls the Court's attention to J.l: 
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F.U. Instruction 21.10. \\-Then that instruction is com-
pared to the instruction given by the court ( T-469) , 
it is apparent that the instruction given by the trial 
court adequately covered the subject and was in com-
pliance with the decision of this Court in Martin v. 
Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P.2d 747. Further, the 
instruction given by the court properly encompasses 
J.I.F.U. Instruction 21.14 on the duty of the person 
having the right of way to use ordinary care himself 
to avoid using the accident. This is in accord with the 
decision of this Court in Sine v. Salt Lake Transpor-
tation Co., 106 Utah 289, 147 P.2d 875. The other 
objections raised with reference to the jury instruction 
given by the court were adequately covered in the in-
structions given by the court. 
The appellant's allegation that the court's In-
structions 8, 9, 10 and 11 violate the rule against 
duplication and repetitious instructions favoring one 
party against another is in no way supported by the 
record. Instruction No. 8 was merely the requirement 
that an individual keep a proper lookout when operat-
ing a vehicle on a public highway. Instruction No. 9 
specified the requirement that the operator of a vehicle 
operate his vehicle in a reasonably safe manner, keep 
control of it, keep a lookout and drive his vehicle at a 
safe speed. Instruction No. 10 was the basic instruction 
on right of way, and Instruction No. 11 was the 
instruction from the Utah statute requiring that the 
operator of a motor vehicle keep his vehicle within a 
speed that is reasonable and prudent under the circum-
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stances. These instructions applied to both parliL 
and were in no way geared to or related to any specifi1 
evidence farnrable to the defendant. Indeed, all tJ1,, 
court's instructions were given in a most objectir: · 
manner without commenting on the evidence. 
It is apparent, therefore, that there is no merit 1 
to the appellant's contention for it is well settled that ~ 
an individual has no right to have his instructions give11 
in the exact language he proposes them. In Redd r. 
Airway 1Jfotor Coach Line, Inc., 104 Utah 9, 137 P.211 
37 4 ( 19"1<3) , this Court stated: 
"Some of the requests of plaintiff were em 
bodied in substance in the charge to the jury. 
and hence he cannot predicate error on the failure 
of the court to follow the exact language of the 
request. Nelson v. Arrowhead Freight Linei 
Ltd., 99 Utah 129, 104 P.2d 225." 
This Court acknowledged the applicability of the 
generally accepted principle that there is no require· 
ment that instructions be in any particular language 
so long as they adequately appraise the jury of the 
issues in Ostertag v. LaMont, 9 Utah 2d 130, 339 P.2d 
1022 ( 1959) . 
In McMurdie v. Underwood, 9 Utah 2d 400, 346 
P.2d 711 ( 1959), the appellant eomplained of the trial 
court's refusal to give certain requested instructions. 
This Court stated: 
" * * * After careful consideration of the 
trial court's instructions we are of the opiniou 
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that the basic is~ues were fairly and intelligibly 
presented to the Jury for its determination.***" 
I: This being so, the court found there was no error. 
In Wilson v. Gardner, 10 Utah 2d 89, 348 P.2d 
931 (1!)60), the appellant objected to the failure of 
it the court to give his requested instructions. This Court 
I stated: 
"The issues, however, were clearly set out to 
the jury in the instructions given and under Rule 
51 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the failure 
to gi\'e either or all of these requested instruc-
tions was not error. In any event the action of 
the trial court was not prejudicial to the de-
fendant herein justifying a reversal of the judg-
ment." 
In Hales v. Peterson, 11 Utah 2d 411, 360 P.2d 
822 (1961), an action was brought for the death of a 
child struck by a truck after entering the street. In 
affirming the verdict for the defendant, this Court 
stated: 
"Certain errors are assigned with respect to 
the instructions. But a survey thereof indicates 
that the issues as to the negligence of the de-
fendant's truckdriver and the contributory neg-
ligence of Nila were fairly and adequately cov-
ered. It may be conceded that a request for 
further instructions were made which accurately 
state the law and which it would not have been 
error to give. But they were not nece~sary. be-
cause the issues were presented to the JUry m a 
fair and understandable manner. This is the 
desired objective and it should be done with the 
least possible instructions. 'Vhen it is accom-
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plished we will not reverse because the co 
refused to give other requested instructions e: 
tho.ugh t~ey contain accurate statements of I: 
wl11ch might also luwe been applicable tot 
case." 
See also the recent and as yet unreported case decia 
by this Court on August 5, 1966, entitled Shupe 
ill enlove, No. 10405. 
"\Vhen the instructions in this case are taken a1 
whole and read together as is the required rule, (Broo 
v. Utah Hotel Co., 108 Utah 220, 159 P.2d J: 
( 1945) ; Haywood v. D. & R.G. JV. Co., 6 Utah: 
155, 307 P.2d 1045 (1957)), it is apparent they covert 
in a reasonable and objective fashion all the issu1 
raised in the case. The appellant's contention that t! 
instructions given by the court and the refusal to gi1 
requested instructions was prejudicial error is n 
supported by the reconl. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMM! 
ERROR IN ALLO"\VING THE RESPONDEX 
TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO THE EFFEC 
THAT THE APPELLANT V\T AS OPERATINI 
HIS YEHICLE AT A HIGH RATE OF SPEE! 
AND IN A DANGEROUS MANNER AT· 
SHORT DISTANCE A"\VAY FROM THi 
SITE OF THE COLLISION, SINCE (A) X1 
OBJECTION "\VAS TIMELY MADE TO TH! 
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ll EYIDENCE; 
;: RELEVANT 
IBLE. 
(B) THE EVIDENCE \VAS 
AND OTHER\VISE ADJ\IISS-
At the time of trial, respondent called Horace 
a J. \' ause, who indicated that he saw the appellant 
operating his vehicle at a high rate of speed and that 
the vehicle turned on two wheels around several corners 
near his house. He indicated that a matter of seconds 
later he heard a crash and went to the accident site 
where he noticed that appellant's vehicle had been in-
yolved in an accident ( T-349, 352). He estimated the 
appellant's speed at approximately 45 miles per hour 
when he saw it ( T-352). He estimated that it was 
25 seconds from the time he last saw the appellant 
until he heard the crash of the collision ( T-355) . All 
of the above testimony was received by the Court with-
out objection. Appellant's counsel cross-examined the 
witness and not until after an extended and lengthy 
cross-examination did appellant move to strike the 
witness's testimony (T-373). The motion to strike did 
not appear to be related to the admission of the evi-
dence but rather to the weight and reliability of the 
( 
evidence. 
\I Mrs. Lorraine Va use, the wife of Horace Vause, 
II also testified that she saw the appellant's vehicle circling 
a block across from their home a "very few seconds" 
!l before the accident and estimated the speed of the 
(I Yehicle to have been over 35 miles per hour (T-379, 
II 380). Mr. and Mrs. Vause then resided at 1222 First 
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Street in the house next to the corner of Iowa Rl . 
1,. p 'irst, which was % of a block North of Sheridta 
Driw and just to the VVest of Tyler Avenue (T-31 
34!)) - Captain Alvin Foulger measured the distan . 
from the corner of Iowa and First Street to the ink 1~ 
section of Sheridan Drive and Tyler Avenue and fom ti 
it to be 1355 feet (T-427). e· 
tl 
.Mr. Gordon F. McFarland, another witness fr ti 
respondent, gave similar testimony that he also sa n 
the appellant's car just before the collision speedi4 li 
past his home and taking a corner just opposite fru: 0 
his house at about 40 to 45 miles per hour ( T-3~' c 
396). Mr. McFarland's house was located on the Wt c 
side of Iowa Street, immediately North of the h01l t 
on the corner of Iowa and First Street, which was tl s 
corner Captain Foulger indicated to be 1355 feet fro 
the accident intersection ( T-427). Although objectir 
was made to Mr. McFarland's testimony the objectii 
was only that Mr. McFarland had not been identifit 
by the witness for the respondent prior to the tri• 
No objection to his tesimony was offered relating I. 
the issue now pressed by appellant in Point IV of h, 
brief. 
It is well settled that the failure to raise time! 
objection to the evidence precludes the raising of tl 
issue for the first time on appeal. Child V. Child, 8 n 
2d 261, 332 P.2d 981 ( 1958). Consequently, sin, 
appellant raised no timely objection to the eviden1 
in the trial court on the same grounds that he 111' 
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1l presses in this Court, the issue cannot be a basis for 
lt a claim for reversal in this Court. 
lj 
In spite of the appellant's procedural failure, there 
n is no merit to his contention in any event. The authori-
t ties cited by the appellant have relevance where the 
rn evidence preceding the event is remote in relation to 
the event. However, all the witnesses in the instant case 
fr testified that they saw the appellant's vehicle only a 
a matter of seconds before it was involved in the col-
Q lision with the respondent. Consequently, the manner 
J: of operation and speed under such circumstances were 
r clearly considerable by the jury since the testimony 
, of the witnesses was not remote in time or distance to 
,' 
1 
the accident. The general rule governing this issue is 
1 set forth in 46 A.L.R. 2d 35, where it is stated: 
"The question whether testimony as to the 
speed of the vehicle at some point before it 
reached the scene of an accident shall be admitted 
or excluded on the ground of remoteness rests 
largely in the discretion of the trial court." 
1 
In Comins v. Scrivener, 214 F.2d 810, (10th Cir. 
l 1954) , the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit ruled that if there was a reasonable 
casual connection between the accident and the speed 
1. at which the individual was seen to be driving prior 
·to the accident, the evidence will be admitted. The 
• Court stated: 
"It is the general rule that the question 
whether evidence shall be admitted tending to 
show the rate of speed of an automobile at the 
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time and place other than that at the instan 
or immedi~tely. prior to t~1e accident dept 
upon the facts m the particular case and 1 
largely in the discretion of the trial court." 
Clearly, there was no improper exercise of the co~ 
discretion in the instant case. 
The same issue was before this Court in the t 
of State v. Freernan, 93 Utah 125, 71 P.2d 196 (rn 
which was a prosecution for involuntary manslaugh' 
In that case, the testimony of a witness for the SI 
was allowed to show that approximately two miles fr 
the accident a vehicle similar in description passed l 
at a speed in excess of 60 miles per hour. The Co: Cor 
said: Sta 
"We cannot say that the court was in er allo 
in the ruling made. Such matters were nr 
enough, in time and place, to be not subjecl 
an objection of remoteness." am 
Further, in the same case, the Court noticed the P' 
cedural failure of counsel to properly move to exclt 
the evidence. 
In Fretz v. Anderson, 5 Utah 2d 290, 300 P 
642 ( 1956), this Court had before it a contention 
appeal that the admission of testimony of an in, 
vidual that he observed a vehicle very similar to I 
one being driven by one of the parties being opera! 
at a peculiarly high rate of speed sometime prior tol 
accident was error. The Court said: 
"In the present case, circumstances narrown 
the probability of the automobile seen by Fran: 
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an 
!pt 
Ir 
't 
ton being the same as the one involved in the 
accident inclu_de t_he early hou~ of the morning, 
the car travelmg m the same direction, the com-
parative rarity of automobiles 14 years old on 
the highway, the location between small towns, 
the paucity of traffic on the highway, and the 
limitation of time between the observation and 
the accident. If the entire case of negligence 
were to be based on this witness's testimony, it 
would not be sufficient to support a verdict; but, 
vie\ved as an aid in explaining just what hap-
pened prior to the overturning of the vehicle, 
it was properly admitted, leaving its weight to 
the determination of the jury." 
'o: Consequently, there is substantial precedent in the 
State of Utah to justify the admission of the evidence 
n allowed in this case. 
In 9C Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law 
and Practice, Section 6235, it is stated: 
"Evidence as to speed of a vehicle shortly prior 
to an accident or at a short distance from the 
place thereof may be relevant in connection with 
other evidence. * * * 
"Ordinarily the speed material for considera· 
tion in an atuomobile accident case is that at the 
instant of or immediately before the accident 
in question. However, whether time and distance 
render evidence of speed prior to the occurrence 
of an accident too remote depends upon the cir-
cumstances, the competency of such evidence 
being determined by 'casual connection or c?n-
tact with the accident' rather than by specific 
distance or time." 
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The cases cited in Blashfield, supra, and the Ann 
tation in 46 A.L.R. 2d, page 9, as well as tho 
from this Court, clearly demonstrate that the trt 
court did not commit error in allowing the / 
d . 1. f · C ence m t us case rom witnesses who within aver 
short period of time and a relatively short dista/ 
from the scene of the accident saw the appellant opera'
1 
ing his vehicle in a reckless manner at a high rate 1 
speed. r 
t 
Appellant cites authority for the proposition th,i' 
if it is clearly established that at an intermediate poiq 
the vehicle stopped, this would render inadmissio; 1 
any testimony of speed at a prior time and place. Tl:~ 
proposition is unapplicable here where it was not clearl.i 
established that appellant's vehicle stopped at an intt1 1 
mediate point and such fact was in effect disputt 1 
by appellant's own passenger and the witnesses Vaui 1 
and McFarland, who stated the accident happem I 
seconds after they had observed the appellant drivin: 1 
his car past their houses. Captain Foulger testified tbi' 
a car traveling 45 miles per hour will take 30 seconfr 
to travel the 1355 feet from the corner of Iowa an 
First Street to the intersection where the acciden 
occurred. 
Under all these circumstances the admission n 
this testimony was within the sound discretion of tli: 
trial court and a claim of error could not be predicate 
now on its admission. 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
~ERROR IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY 
OF A WITNESS WHOSE NAME ,;y AS NOT 
PROVIDED TO PLAINTIFF PRIOR 'I'O 
!TRIAL. 
I 
The appellant's final argument indicates the despe-
ration and futility of his appeal. He argues that the 
trial court committed error warranting reversal because 
it allowed Mr. Gordon F. McFarland, a witness called 
by the respondent, to testify when the name of Mr . 
.McFarland had not been presented to the appellant 
as a proposed witness. The pretrial order entered in the 
instant case did not require that all names of all wit-
nesses to be called at the time of trial be furnished 
to counsel for the opposite party on penalty that if 
any witness was called whose name was not furnished 
the testimony would not be received. The pretrial 
order merely stated that the witnesses proposed to be 
called at the time of trial be furnished to opposing 
counsel within 10 days of trial (R-5). 
In the instant case, there is a statement m the 
record by counsel for the respondent that he was un-
aware of Mr. McFarland havinlg information con-
cerning the case until the night before he testified. 
Further, there is a statement in the record that counsel 
for the respondent advised the appellant's counsel of 
the witness the following morning sometime before he 
was called to testify (T-392). Attorneys appearing 
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I 
I 
I 
in the courts in the State of Utah are officers ofj 
courts. In making representations to the court 
cerning their knowledge and information, they l 
subject to the canons of ethics. There is no evid~ 
of record of any kind to indicate that the represe 
tions made by counsel for the respondent were not tt 
The matter of the calling of witnesses under such· 
eumstances rests in the sound discretion of the t 
court. There is no merit to the appellant's content 
and the issue is frivolous. 
CONCLUSION 
In the lengthy trial of this case, which contin 
5 full days, the issues were thoroughly explored I 
both appellant and respondent. The jury had bef 
it all the relevant evidence, viewed the accident · 
and was properly instructed on the law. It is appa 
from the verdict returned of no cause of action 
the jury did not consider the sole and proximate c 
of the accident in which the appellant was alleg 
injured to have been the respondent's negligence. 
issues raised on appeal present no basis for a new tr 
This Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID K. "\VATKISS, ES 
GEORGE B. HANDY, ES 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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